Devanshi Upadhyaya

Zusammenfassung

The evaluation of fault attacks on security-critical hardware implementations of cryptographic primitives is an important concern. In such regards, we have created a framework for automated construction of fault attacks on hardware realization of ciphers. The framework can be used to quickly evaluate any cipher implementations, including any optimisations. It takes the circuit description of the cipher and the fault model as input. The output of the framework is a set of algebraic equations, such as conjunctive normal form (CNF) clauses, which is then fed to a SAT solver. We consider both attacking an actual implementation of a cipher on an field-programmable gate array (FPGA) platform using a fault injector and the evaluation of an early design of the cipher using idealized fault models. We report the successful application of our hardware-oriented framework to a collection of ciphers, including the advanced encryption standard (AES), and the lightweight block ciphers LED and PRESENT. The corresponding results and a discussion of the impact to different fault models on our framework are shown. Moreover, we report significant improvements compared to similar frameworks, such as speedups or more advanced features. Our framework is the first algebraic fault attack (AFA) tool to evaluate the state-of-the art cipher LED-64, PRESENT and full-scale AES using only hardware-oriented structural cipher descriptions.